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Abstract: The article traces the haunting of the contemporary art field by a post-1989 cultural 
and political imaginary captured in Douglas Coupland’s novel Generation X: Tales for an 
Accelerated Culture (1991). This was a formative literary work for its anti-work stance but also 
the narrativisation of withdrawal in awe of processes of acceleration that saw production 
principles translating into “dazed and confused” lifestyles. The preference of Gen-Xers for 
“microcosms”, where withdrawal encountered low-fi collectivism, became more prevalent in 
subsequent decades and aligned with a democracy realised, and idealised, as the politics of 
“anti” (including anti-fascism) – exemplified in the art field in its association with an ethical 
left. Constant and glorified antagonisms join the liberal art field to the social field, forever re-
scripting ‘anti’ as TINA – the principle that “there is no alternative”. TINA, it is argued, is 
assuming specific figurations within the largely left-inclined art terrain where commoning 
practices remain cut off from the propositional politics of communism while, both within and 
beyond the art field, technophilia is legitimised left and right as a substitute for the desire for 
communism. The main theses of the article are that: (a) such developments are intertwined 
with a political process of struggle that delivers alienation as their main outcome – that is, 
alienation from an imagined endpoint of the struggle and (b) that such alienation cannot be 
considered separately from the hegemony of acceleration in light of the traumatic withdrawal 
from, and of, communism and capitalism’s continuous re-working of prefigurative anti-
communism.  
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A post-1989 transition: Generation X as a passage from the proletariat to the 
precariat 
In the early 1990s, Douglas Coupland’s Generation X: Tales for an Accelerated Culture (1991) 
captured the state of disaffection that defined a transnational western youth stretching from 
Canada to Greece. A selection of the novel’s chapter titles and slogans, which adorned the 
margins of its pages as an aesthetic hangover from yesterday’s postmodernism, are revealing: 
(Titles) Our parents had more. Quit your job. Purchased experiences don’t count. Remember Earth Clearly. 
Define normal. Trans form. Why am I poor? (Slogans) Semi-Disposable Swedish Furniture. Economy of 
Scale is Ruining Choice. Eroticise Intelligence. Air Family: Describing the false sense of community experienced 
among coworkers in an office environment. You might not count in the new order. And, importantly: Rebellion 
postponement. 
Focused on labour, typically marginalised in the visual arts and literature of the 
postmodern 1980s, Coupland had, nonetheless, intuitively moved his narrativisation of 
discontent from the industrial proletariat to the service and experience economy in post-
Fordism. This is where we find the novel’s protagonists, ready to drop out. If in 1967 Roger 
Zelazny’s Lord of Light provided the salient science-fiction/fantasy reference to accelerationism, 
where the “Accelerationists” wish to enlighten a “primitive” agrarian, non-Earth society 
through the speedy introduction of technology, by 1991 accelerationism had migrated into a 
novel title of a work that intimated to its readers the lived reality, dilemmas and sense of earthly 
history of a post-1989 generation. At first sight, this generation embodied the collapse of 
American-Dream capitalism; and at second sight (induced by the novel’s subtitle), it appeared 
trapped in the vertigo of speed as capitalism’s best, new lifestyle – generating magazine titles 
such as Dazed and Confused (which appeared also in 1991). But the generational trauma lay 
elsewhere. Just before the global financial crisis of 2008, a Gen-Xer (Neate 2007) reflected on 
what was his generation’s “Vietnam” and answered “the end of the Cold War and the collapse 
of the Eastern Bloc”, connecting this retrospective wisdom with how and why Coupland’s 
novel became the bible of post-1989 western youth, self-diagnosed with “career insecurity” 
and above all “alienation”. In the wake of this collapse, Generation X perceived and described 
capitalism’s full embracing of accelerated production sold as ultimate freedom – a state of 
affairs from which the 1990s youth dis-identified by becoming, or at least posing as, “slackers” 
and “idlers”: the iconic magazine The Idler was founded in 1993 (which, as Wikipedia informs 
us, infused its commitment to idling as a life goal with “pre-industrial revolution idealism”). 
Understandably, the terms in which this dis-identification from the status quo was expressed 
were not conducive to revolutionary action: “rebellion postponement”. 
As the 1990s advanced, the anti-globalisation movement opposing G7, the IMF and the 
World Bank mobilised only part of this disaffected youth, setting the tune to the oppositional 
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politics of “anti”, while the suspicion that “you might not count in the new world order” 
became a certainty in the advent of “the precariat” of the early 2000s (Standing 2011), so 
familiar to the art world, as suggested by a voluminous art literature (indicatively, see Abbing 
2002; Aranda et al. 2011). A generation less bonded by birth date and more by a shared 
historical experience of redundancy, the precariat included anyone from students trapped in 
unpaid internships, the “economically active” trapped in job poverty, pensioners robbed of 
their pensions, not to mention those hit by capital’s commitment to expelling labour – 
associated with accelerated automation by Jeremy Rifkin’s The End of Work in 1995 but reviewed 
in terms of more but worse jobs by contemporary Marxists (see Moody 2018). The precarious 
were forced to take louder action in their confrontation with the intersecting and varied forces 
sustaining neoliberalism and its political outcomes. Who does not remember 2011 as the year 
of the protester, as per the TIME magazine cover? Insurgencies were noted across the best 
part of the globe. Hopes arose. In 2012, Jodi Dean would write about Occupy in terms of 
offering the outline of a new party: “the remarkable rupture the movement effects arises out 
of its organisation of a radical collective response to capitalism” (Dean 2012, 246). In January 
2015, a coalitional “radical left” party drawn from social movements and headed by a late Gen-
Xer (Alexis Tsipras, age 15 when the novel came out) seasoned in the 1990s student uprisings, 
became government in Greece on which a very dirty debt game was, and is, being played. In 
2019, hardly anyone needs to be reminded what the fate of Occupy and the party of Syriza has 
been. In both cases, considerable and diverse forms of violence – from bulldozers to capital 
controls – were exercised to make the insurgents capitulate. If such a development was up to 
a point predictable, the basic lesson to be learned is that that mobilisations relying on 
collectivism and scripted merely as oppositional politics tend to not deliver, with the anti-
globalisation movement being already symptomatic of the limitations of an “anti” political 
culture and carrying the GenXers’ alienation – an anti-work stance without an alternative – at its 
core. The principal contention of this article is that this complex configuration of a political 
impulse premised on “without” and witnessed, at the very least, in the western 1990s still haunts 
what Fredric Jameson identified as a historically shaped “political unconscious”, arguing 
already at the dawn of the 1980s that:  
[…] a Left which cannot grasp the immense Utopian appeal of nationalism (any more 
that it can grasp that of religion or of fascism) can scarcely hope to ‘reappropriate’ such 
collective energies and must effectively doom itself to political impotence (Jameson 
1981, 298). 
In 2019, Jameson’s words can be rethought as a warning to the left – a warning that the left 
ignored. As the second decade of the 21st century is drawing to a close, nationalism, religion, 
and updated iterations of fascism are a winning political formula filling the void of a so-called 
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“utopian” vision that the left abandoned in succumbing to the historical pressures of the 1989 
trauma. 
The ‘anti’ struggles  
Yet the world (read: history) did not end with these and similar containments. The anti-
capitalist struggle goes on as part of a wider political culture attached to what we could call 
“opposition politics” or “politics of response” to the phenomenal range of offensives launched 
by the status quo: police brutality, low pay, debt, privatisation of resources, environmental 
destruction, attacks on reproductive rights, welfare, and education; border fortification and new 
concentration camps; structural adjustment policies, settler-colonialism and land grabbing, and 
so on. All these, and more, are vehemently opposed. It would be disingenuous to say that the 
left has given up. Yet my main tenet in this exposition (as part of a broader, incomplete enquiry) 
is that the historically specific articulation of this struggle as a political process premised on 
opposition, or “anti” politics, is but another expression of the angst-ridden withdrawal at the 
heart of the post-1989 political impulse. It is an expression that makes, in fact, this angst-ridden 
withdrawal less and less recognisable, more and more disavowed – an alienation of the alienation, 
if you will – and threatening to hollow out the struggle in terms of an updated Sisyphus parable: 
a project of estrangement between the actually existing subject-in-struggle and the actually non-existing 
end-point of the struggle. 
Gen-X lasted very little, the short ‘90s, a threshold decade with “change” on the agenda: 
this is when the women of Eastern Europe were instructed to move speedily from feminism 
to post-feminism so as to catch with a particular expression of Western hegemony serving the 
interests of capital in its most powerful global moment (Dimitrakaki 2000), given the 
feminisation of labour and of poverty that was underway and the analysis of which required an 
updated rather than a dead feminism; this is when, in the concluding chapter of his highly 
influential study The Return of the Real, American art historian Hal Foster detected the speedy 
return of a fascist subject in electronic culture (Foster 1996); this is when those who followed 
upon a defeated, dispersed, pacified or even suburbanised, and eventually indebted, proletariat 
would exorcise their alienation from a world in which they “did not count” by seeking refuge 
into “microcosms”. In 1997, I described my own alienated microcosm, an Athenian communal 
apartment the residents of which shunned both their immediate urban reality and the global 
whirlpool outside the apartment as alien – in the semi-autobiographical novel Antarctica. But as 
regards the art field, French curator Nicolas Bourriaud’s “microcosms” of interpersonal 
relations re-purposed alienation as pragmatism conducive to “better living” (Bourriaud 2002), 
renewing thus art’s promise of de-alienation in a surprising way that captured the art field’s 
imagination.  
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As a trope for turn-of-the century living, microcosms proved enduring: preserving 
collectivity in an elementary form while allowing for atomised ennui, they legitimised further an 
articulation of the social through “different” and, why not, antithetical goals. The ongoing 
mutation of feminism into plural “feminisms”, strongly present since the 1990s, is but an 
example – where, for instance, neoliberal feminism could forever run in parallel with anti-
capitalist or Black feminism. Justifying the co-habitation of microcosms, “difference” and 
“diversity” became the buzzwords of the liberal West and its “healthy” democracy where 
“political correctness” was prescribed as the medication of choice for addressing chronic 
antagonisms. As divisions deepened and antagonisms became exacerbated, microcosms 
pulsating around the negative space of the “postponed rebellion” eventually flourished into the 
all-engulfing culture of “anti” politics. In environments defined by steep divides, such as crisis-
ridden Athens, this is plain for all to see – from the city’s now ubiquitously marked walls (with 
people coming from all over the world to stamp their “anti” as graffiti), to a parliament of 
regular fierce debates, to endless issue-based street protests (on “issues” that can range from 
the abhorrent “accidental” public lynching of an HIV-positive gay activist to sector-specific 
strikes over pay), to packed art events of heightened affect and deferred effect: the participants’ 
raw emotions and agitation seldom translate into actual change.  
Given the above, it strikes one as less of a coincidence that the Athens Biennial 2018 
edition came under the theme and title of ANTI1. The Athens Biennial 2018 theme became 
known to me through a controversy carried out through the social media and the international 
art press and involving two invited artists: Luke Turner withdrew from ANTI after the Athens 
Biennial refused to drop Daniel Keller, who had reportedly abused Turner on Twitter in 
support of artist Deanna Havas (not invited to the Biennial), known for her alt-right posturing 
– Havas had “liked” an image where a far-right symbol subverted an anti-Trump piece by 
Turner. This tragedy of tweets has many jaw-dropping aspects that relate to our proliferating 
“anti” culture – especially the gluing of emancipatory politics (in this case, feminism) to 
whatever reactionary posturing: in his tweets, Keller repeatedly stated that he was defending a 
“woman artist” drawn from “poverty” (read: working class) and abused by an established male 
artist. Yet this woman artist’s tweets included “Bannon is cool” as well as her wish to issue “a 
                                               
1 I was unaware of the Athens Biennial 2018’s title ANTI when I started working on an earlier version of this 
paper on “anti” politics upon the invitation of Kunsthalle Wien to contribute to Antarktika: A Symposium on 
Alienation, 4-6 October 2018, details of which can be found at http://kunsthallewien.at/#/en/events/antarctica-
symposium-alienation-2. For a summary of the symposium, see Chwatal, Christoph. 2018. “Notes on Antarctica: 
A Symposium of Alienation.” Kunsthalle Wien Blog, October 12, http://kunsthallewien.at/#/blog/2018/10/notes-
antarctica-symposium-alienation. 
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fatwa on socialist students” (a selection was wisely anthologised by Turner on this webpage: 
http://luketurner.com/Deanna_Havas/). 
Following the social media heat, the controversy quickly unfolded as a questioning over 
the role of an art institution in the specific form of alienation known as the aestheticisation of 
politics – with the crux of the matter being that this could apply to any politics. Critics of the 
Athens Biennial’s stance in the controversy took issue with its very focus on “anti”:  
The Biennial’s vision of “ANTI” […] as an “attitude”, as non-conformity detached 
from any definite political orientation, and of “marginality” abstracted from social 
history, is presented as a daring transgression of rigidified political correctness. It is in 
fact a badly written celebration of the “pleasure” of political centrism. […] ANTI begins 
with a list of places where middle-class artists go […]: “[T]he gym, the office, the tattoo 
studio, the dating website, the migration office, the shopping mall, the nightclub, the 
church, the dark room” (SDLD50 2018).  
And the critics, the London-based anti-fascist group SDLD50 that in 2017 had led the protests 
against gallery LD50’s platforming of neo-reactionaries, conclude: 
They [the Biennial] say that “ANTI is not a neutral discussion platform but an agonistic 
space hosting different approaches on how to deal with ominous tendencies in politics 
and culture. Diverse voices are essential to initiate a meaningful discussion on how to 
combat such issues. Dealing with these controversial issues is the exact core of the 
conceptual framework of the exhibition and denotes the urgency of ANTI”. But all that 
this amounts to is yet another confirmation of the disabling self-regard of the bourgeois 
arts professional for whom nothing is more urgent, or more terrifyingly under 
threat, than the “diverse”, “meaningful”, “controversial”, and “agonistic” sound of their 
own voice, along with all of the vulnerable adjectives that they are paid by the word to 
say it (SDLD50 2018). 
The crucial question for SDLD50 is one of strategy: anti-fascists in the art field must prioritise 
the material impact felt by those oppressed and destroyed by such hatred. SDLD50 accused 
the Athens Biennial that rather than doing that, it adopted the liberal strategy of dialogue – 
effectively, a dialogue among the proliferating “anti” – thus offering public visibility to 
positions that can range from the “non-explicitly anti-fascist” to the “fascist-curious”, to the 
“crypto-fascist” (to my knowledge, the Biennial would exclude self-identified fascists). In short, 
SDLD50 implicitly charged the Biennial with replicating the model of representative parliamentary 
democracy where a spectrum of fascist-related political parties such as Golden Dawn (Greece), 
the AfD (Germany), the Front National (France), to name but a few, compete with everyone 
else for attention and power. Indeed, the argument that art institutions “reproduce the 
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limitations of parliamentarianism and retain the concrete space of liberal democratic parliament 
as a kind of imprint or inner image wherever they go and whatever they do” was recently made 
by Egyptian curator Bassam El Baroni (2017, 232–233), who has examined a number of 
nuanced philosophical positions on the matter. 
There is nothing simple then about this “anti” controversy in the art world. The 
contradictions this seemingly internal controversy reveals constitute the consensus on what 
democracy means at present: a “democracy of equivalence”, an electoral accounting potentially 
at least legitimising the power of any majority over any minority. It is this equivalence that we 
witness as “the free, public expression of opinion”, registered in Artur Zmijewski’s Democracies 
(2009) where micro-collectivities advocate their possibly antithetical politics (Dimitrakaki 
2015). This is then registered and signified as an unsolvable problem, a necessary shortcoming 
of the condition of democracy as practised in civil society. But if so, on what grounds can an 
antifascist group criticise an arts organisation for operating according to the consensus on 
democracy, committed to engaging “diverse approaches on how to deal with ominous 
tendencies in politics and culture”, as per the Biennial’s ANTI mission statement? 
I might as well ask, as a self-identified anti-fascist: is there anything that makes my 
position not equivalent to that of a fascist within the current consensus? The moral argument 
– that I am in solidarity with the oppressed whereas the fascist is on the side of the oppressor 
– does not stand. Neo- and historical fascists typically name an oppressed group (e.g. x nation 
oppressed by “foreign” elements figured as an external or internal enemy) they speak for and, 
as populism puts it, with. In the politics of anti, their oppressed are locked in an endless 
confrontation with my oppressed. In the art field of anti, I have also been asked if a “cool 
antifascist” throwing a stone and killing someone is better than a “fascist asshole” who does 
the same – and the language used, here culled from my private communication with a leading 
curator (that I will keep anonymous), reveals the easy corruption of political positions into 
lifestyles. In the political culture of anti, it has been possible to claim that neo-reactionary 
philosopher/eugenicist “[Nick] Land could be a Marxist deep troll” and, that “Land himself 
even remarked that the Alt Right is a mass political movement against capitalism incubating, 
unexpectedly, from the right” (SDLD50 2017). In this context of ideological daze and 
confusion, it is thus unsurprising to hear that both artists implicated in the Athens Biennial 
controversy place themselves on the left – with Keller claiming that their disagreement is 
merely on “tactics” (Christie 2018). 
Observing all this as symptomatic of an accelerated ideological interchangeability, I 
propose to also read it as a political process which has alienation as its main outcome: 
embedded in the political culture of anti is the constant threat of being drawn into 
identifications with what one dis-identifies from. This is not experienced as open-ended textual 
practice (postmodernism) but as dead-end social practice locked in the Athens Biennial ANTI’s 
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anagram: TINA. There is no alternative. There is only a loop in which everything can be 
connected with everything. In the political culture of anti, anyone can be praised as an anti-
capitalist and anyone can be accused as a fascist. Marx can be called, and has been, “the first 
accelerationist” (Beckett 2017). Deanna Havas – defended as “poor” and a “woman artist” by 
Keller in his tweets – stated in an interview that her political sympathies change according to 
“moods” – and specifically: “My job is really to be apolitical. I can feel one way one day, and if 
my mood is different another day then I can try on different ideas and ideologies, and just step 
out of them —and that’s fine” (Havas 2016). Or, “we are considering untapped possibilities”, 
arch-accelerationist Robin McKay said – friend of both NRx-er Nick Land and the late author 
of Capitalist Realism, Mark Fisher (Beckett 2017). This is not a hollowing out of political 
positions, what we would call an “emptying of meaning”, along the lines of Jameson’s famous 
appraisal of postmodern art as “surrealism without the unconscious” (see Jameson 1991) – that 
is, as a paradigm that deploys the fragment yet disinvested from any source that might anchor 
it to meaning (though the self-association of many Surrealists with communism indicates that 
more can be read into Jameson’s formulation). Rather, we are faced here with an over-
abundance of meaning, with a proliferation of content making the form appear rock solid. 
Before considering why we have a high concentration of content but no indication of social 
transformation, I will briefly sketch out why the art field is such a fertile ground for the politics 
of anti and what interests this alignment serves.  
 
The art field as ideal democracy: The labour - participation nexus 
The contemporary art field is very hospitable to political struggles because of the blurry line 
between labour and participation, both of which are required for the production of value 
(indicatively, see Sholette 2010; Vishmidt 2013). In the art field, the exchange – between (or 
partial and nebulous overlapping of) the wage-entrepreneurial condition and the uncorrupted-
from-money “life” (protest, affect, play, activism, intellect, exploration) of civil society – may 
not be experienced as an exchange at all, but rather as a fusion of work and life underpinned 
by relative autonomy. In other words, the art field achieves and glorifies the exact opposite of 
what Frédéric Lordon sees as imperative for extricating the social from the subjugation of desire 
to capital: “the (re)separation of work and activity” (Lordon 2014, 134).  
If your work-form as an artist or curator is exhausting and oppressive, at least you can 
devote its substance-content to the political cause of your choice – given especially that the 24/7 
work-form leaves no time for “external” occupations. Art is where a social subject can spend, 
self-consciously and by choice, a lifetime dedicated to a political cause without the pressure of 
taking power and without changing the world – turning thus John Holloway’s political 
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proposition “to change the world without taking power” on its head (Holloway 2002) and 
instantiating it as the distillation of what is worth preserving from the messier world of actually 
existing democracy. The struggle continues in the art field day and night, when the outside 
world goes to the gym, watches Netflix, worries only about money, migrates for work rather 
than rebel against work, joins the protest rally but then returns to flattening everydayness for 
the next two months. “We’re here all night debating nationalism, and the nation watches 
football!” an artist from post-Soviet Estonia complained to my art history student-self in 1998. 
This state of affairs is well known. It is, in fact, the one described in the curatorial statement of 
ANTI twenty years later. 
I did not include however “goes to artist-run space” as part of this state of affairs because 
doing so would have brought forth the charge that by “state of affairs” I mean the middle class 
– just as SDLD50 connected the Athens Biennial ANTI theme with “the bourgeois arts 
professional”, irrespective of the class background of the curators. Investigating and identifying 
individuals’ class backgrounds would have been superfluous – as superfluous as the adjective 
“bourgeois” in the phrase – because art as an “ideal democracy” carries an indelible class stamp, 
marking anyone who enters it, and no number of precarious art workers has been big enough 
to challenge the radiance of the imprint. There is, of course, adequate evidence about the 
diverse connections between art and the rich: from British Petroleum sponsorship to offshore 
and real estate (for instructive recent cases in relation to offshore and real estate see Garside, 
Bernstein and Watt 2016 and Miranda and Lane-McKinely 2017, respectively). Yet here I am 
not referring to this kind of articulation of art and class, analysed extensively in contemporary 
art literature (indicatively, see Davis 2013). Instead, I am interested in how the process of struggle 
in the art field’s ideal democracy serves specific class interests.  
First, this process makes failure acceptable and heroic by incorporating contemporary 
struggles into the lineage of the “failed” historical avant gardes – a position polished to 
sparkling clarity by Boris Groys in his positively inflected account of the dead ends of activist 
art: 
[…] art activism cannot escape a much more radical, revolutionary tradition of the 
aestheticization of politics—the acceptance of one’s own failure, understood as a 
premonition and prefiguration of the coming failure of the status quo in its totality, 
leaving no room for its possible improvement or correction. The fact that contemporary 
art activism is caught in this contradiction is a good thing. First of all, only self-
contradictory practices are true in a deeper sense of the word. And secondly, in our 
contemporary world, only art indicates the possibility of revolution as a radical change 
beyond the horizon of our present desires and expectations (Groys 2014). 
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What makes, then, art an ideal democracy is that it also includes the revolution that never comes 
– is there a position that captures more exuberantly the hypocrisy of the so-called liberal left? 
Why bother to identify with precision “desires and expectations” when you can remain in the 
familiar, nebulous but all the same hopeful state of “possibility” and operate as if an unspecified 
“revolution” is bound to happen at some point? As such, the process of struggle in the art field 
becomes the salient, updated case study of Jean-Francois Lyotard’s Libidinal Economy (1974 
(1983)) where selective enjoyment of oppression is linked with the suspicion that “the system 
of capital is, when all’s said and done, natural” (Lyotard quoted in Beckett 2017).  
Second, the art field pacifies critique, in self-identifying as the most experimental, open-
minded, self-critical context for pursuing political causes, where the most acute and animated 
exchanges are safely accommodated as pre-eminently discursive. Art is where the far ends of the 
spectrum of the politics of anti can sublimate their antitheses in a shared room as words 
separated from deeds, despite the materiality of object-based or performative artworks – and 
the relatively recent adoption of so-called discursive practices by art institutions exemplify this. 
The art field is the over-production of discursivity. Art, for the most part (unless it collides with 
the law), is the opposite of what in recent years has been identified as “Trump-ness”. As Dean 
notes in claiming Trump as “the most honest” US politician, Trump-ness ultimately reveals the 
“truth of economic inequality: civility is for the middle class” (Dean 2015).  
Accelerationism, commoning, alienation, art: The politics of anti as the 
hegemony of prefigurative anti-communism 
In the beginning, we are told, there was May ’68, the Western political experience, which marks 
the rise of contemporary art, often posited as distinct from, if related to, modern art. American 
art historian Grant Kester, in his article “Lessons in Futility” (2009), and especially the section 
“May ’68 and the Third Way”, summarises the intellectual justification of the Foucauldian take 
on diffused power and of postmodernism (without naming either) following the dead end of 
May ‘68 as a politics of opposition – or “refusal”: “We push our refusal to the point of refusing 
to be assimilated into the political groups that claim to refuse what we refuse”, as the Student-
Writers Action Committee wrote in a statement on 20 May’ (quoted in Kester 2009, 411). 
Kester comments ironically on the outcome: “We cannot yet be trusted with the freedom that 
would result from a total revolution. Instead we must practise this freedom in the virtual space 
of the text or artwork, supervised by the poet or artist” (Kester 2009, 412). When it comes to 
how these developments impacted post-2000 art, he lists the following: “dissensus over 
consensus”, “rupture and immediacy over continuity and duration”, “extreme skepticism 
concerning organized political action”, “re-coding of political transformation into a form of 
ontic disruption directed at any coherent system of belief, agency or identity” (Kester 2009, 
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407). Yet, the list provided by Kester has a longer history, as it outlines the political programme 
of postmodernism, at least as implemented in the art world – merely hinted at by Kester who 
notes “the rapprochement between neo-conceptual art practice and poststructuralist theory 
during the 1990s” (Kester 2009, 407). Yet, had he paid attention to the direction of feminist 
art theory from the mid-1970s onwards, he would have been able to piece together a longer 
narrative implicating precisely his noted “rapprochement”: gradually abandoning both 
Marxism and references to the material articulation of gender and class, feminist art theory 
focused on artworks as “texts” requiring complex decoding. Let us then say that Generation X 
lived the post-1989 “disappeared” East as trauma because it was already told repeatedly that 
whereas opposition is desirable, only failure is possible – at least when the battle is situated in 
the material field of socio-economic relations; and that failure can still be celebrated, with art 
providing a roller-coaster model of climactic promises and anticlimactic groundings, available 
to the individual and collective libidos of its workers/participants. 
Writing in 2008–2009, Kester notes however the change underway: the mass shift to 
collectivism in contemporary art, highlighting both “the possibilities” but also “the aporia of 
contemporary collaborative art practice” (Kester 2009, 419). A decade on we are confronted 
mostly with the aporia and must wonder why the wave of collectivism is proving powerless 
against the seemingly invincible principle of “dissensus”. What the wave of collectivism has led 
to is the disposition of the art field as an ethical left – what outspoken right-wingers or “centrists” 
complain about in arguing against this left’s “political correctness” – which cannot be 
comprehended in isolation from the trajectory of the political left. Both lefts exist as spectrums 
that at times align and at times do not – the ethical left mostly given to grassroots activities, 
activisms and “communing”; the political left organising into programmes that entail access to 
state and institutional power (ridiculed by the right as “Corbynomics”) that respond to “ills” 
and “injustice”. Both lefts find it altogether hard to overthrow the consensus on “There is no 
alternative”, TINA, which permitted both the dominance of neoliberalism as a decades-long 
project of restoring and securing “upper-class power” (Harvey 2007, 28) and the 
impoverishment of democracy as the political culture of “anti”. In this system of values and 
evaluation of social movements and social practice, dissensus has been extolled as the single 
possible consensus. This is the case at least since 1985 when Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist Strategy launched post-Marxist political theory. Providing us with 
two lengthy critiques of the influential book, Norman Geras notes (among many other things) 
that the argument “is […] normatively indeterminate, fit to support virtually any kind of 
politics, progressive or reactionary” as well as how “disappointingly thin are the ideas on 
democracy” and indeed connected with “some of the more standard tropes of Cold War anti-
Marxism” (Geras 1988, 35; see also Geras 1987). To remind us, this is the book that British art 
historian Claire Bishop cited in her widely influential October article (Bishop 2004) in developing 
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her argument about how art can be really a site of democratic politics and revelatory aesthetics, 
as a response to Bourriaud’s investment in temporary, site-specific conviviality despite 
antagonisms in his Relational Aesthetics. That is, anti-politics is promoted as the sine qua non 
ground of contemporary art entanglement with the social, from which we learn that all roads 
lead to Rome. Needless to say, but I do, that both Bishop and Bourriaud’s position form part 
of art’s left critique. 
Yet, what counts as “left critique” in times of ideological interchangeability boosted by 
social media plots is an issue in its own right. This is clearly demonstrated in a 28 February 
2019 podcast (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yvUcO8sQZSI) where renowned Marxist 
feminist philosopher Nina Power is in conversation with the neo-reactionaries DC Miller (who 
opposed the closure of antifascist activists against the LD50 gallery among his other 
achievements) and anti-secularist, pro-Catholic Justin Murphy (who tweets “Make 
Communism Elite Again”, 31 August 2018 and writes even more confused stuff at his 
theotherlifenow blog). The video is a textbook case of how the erosion of left credibility is 
actualised in the political culture of anti where “anything goes”. It presents a vista where a 
Marxist feminist scholar embraces paganism and spiritualism but rejects “contemporary 
feminism” (including, one assumes, the International Women’s Strike and any other anti-
capitalist feminisms) and advocates “free speech” while counselling us against the repudiation 
of “fascists” and “Trump supporters”; where “communism” and actual, historically 
documented religious “human sacrifice” are matters that elicit silence and giggles by the 
philosophically inclined interlocutors; where anti-intellectualism is adopted as a starting point 
for discussion; where Catholicism is promoted as a community while not a word is uttered 
about women’s oppression and abortions. The video has been promoted by platforms such as 
Red Scare on Reddit, as it expresses adequately the platform’s purposeful ideological confusion 
which, in its own right, exemplifies the lengths at which neo-reactionaries will go to undermine 
any vector of the critical left and especially anything and anyone associated with communism. 
In the politics of anti, self-identifying as a communist, as Justin Murphy does, can be the most 
effective anti-communism. Indeed, Power herself brings up Slovenian band Laibach to argue 
the benefits of “testing the limits of society”, obscuring completely, or being ignorant of, the 
political context of strategies of over-identification in parts of pre-1989 Eastern Europe. Yet 
“testing the limits of society” clearly belongs to the privileged, and embracing such “testing” 
proves right the suspicious stance of anti-fascists such as SDLD50 (discussed earlier in this 
article) over how the art field accommodates such privilege against the material reality of the 
social subjects that suffer these “limits”. 
The contemporary “anti” political culture of accelerated ideological interchangeability 
lends Geras’s remarks from thirty years ago the clout of a prophecy. Saving face as “post-
Marxism” while the Soviet paradigm was being discredited and China was "reforming” (de-
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collectivisation of agriculture, foreign investors, private businesses between 1978 and 1985), 
the left did participate and even led the democracy of equivalence or “of any kind of politics”. 
Yet I disagree with Geras when he proposes “Cold War anti-Marxism” as the pool of ideas 
responsible for this twist of the plot. The anti-Marxist turn was rather symptomatic of 
capitalism’s most successful and long-term campaign – anti-communism – always adapting to 
capitalism’s own complex trajectory. Along with the ascent of neoliberalism, we see Marxism 
itself becoming the endless analysis of capitalism, marginalising severely the analysis of 
communism (bar the historical execution of state-run experiments) and elaborations of a 
communist imaginary. 
If it can be inferred from Silvia Federici’s Caliban and the Witch (2004) that capitalism arose 
as a response to the emergent threat of communism, if the suppression of the Paris Commune 
by the Republic fits in such a narrative, the story of modernity splinters from the outset – 
making capitalism as anti-communism the terrain of realised modernity. Yet fleshing out 
speculations over “what would have happened if…” lies beyond the scope of this article. The 
fact is that, today, a left unable and in part unwilling, to deploy its intellectual, organisational 
and grass-roots capacities to foreground communism as an alternative, lacks orientation and is 
confined to a politics of opposition (including anti-fascism) when it faces again an updated, 
techno-modernised fascism as an increasingly credible politics of proposition. It is this ominous yet 
actual political development that forces me to suggest that the first step towards ending the left 
as merely a politics of opposition and response and towards re-uniting the ethical and the 
political left is to combat the hegemony of anti-communism and its power of shaping 
subjectivities through degrees of alienation. 
Such combating would require careful analysis and mapping to join the dots of the many 
facets of this – at times, violent; at times, subtle – evacuation of the historical scene. The 
hegemony of anti-communism is global – executed materially and discursively. We can observe 
it across the former East in long-term campaigns of evacuating public space from any traces 
of an annoying and embarrassing past: change of street names, removal of statues, closure of 
archives (and of course, reclamation and normalisation of reactionary histories). We can 
observe it in the former West’s regular press features against “totalitarianism”, including the 
European Union’s Remembrance Day for Victims of Totalitarian Regimes, agreed in 2008, as 
the combined evils of fascism and communism – while, as curators Antonia Majaca and Jelena 
Vesić have noted in the context of the outstanding Parapolitics curatorial project (HKW, Berlin 
2017), totalitarianism, “a term of cultural othering during the Cold War […] became a pretext 
for the birth of contemporary art and the process of its elusive canonization” (Majaca and Vesić 
2017). In post-2010 Greece, with the right fighting endlessly the grab of power by the left (no 
matter how humiliated the latter is), we note particular variations of anti-communist 
propaganda, with the mainstream press featuring recently an article on how Greece is the only 
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communist country in the civilised world thanks to Syriza (Παπαδόπουλος 2018), and with 
right-wing ideologues rewriting the history of the country’s Civil War. We find anti-
communism in China where the regime reportedly attacks and imprisons communist students 
who, in taking seriously their school texts, reflect on what communism can be and take action 
(indicatively, see Haas 2018; Hernandez 2018; Yang 2019). Even the “communist” party 
leading capitalist China is worried about the possibility of people thinking seriously about 
communism – at present, all regimes sustaining the global distribution of power and wealth 
are. 
Indeed, the perception that contemporary China is communist plays perfectly as part of 
global anti-communism, making Stalinism as communism a less exciting episode of the saga. 
In his chapter on “communist accelerationism”, Benjamin Noys points to the connection 
between the pitfalls of Soviet accelerationism, especially in its mutation to Stalinist “labour 
discipline”, to the thread that leads to the current status of China in technophiles’ imaginary 
when he says that “the Maoist ‘Great Leap Forward” would also repeat the tragedy’ (Noys 
2014, 35). At the core of this tragedy, we find the resistance of capitalist technology, inevitably 
adopted by the young Soviet Union, to be re-purposed towards “communist ends” (Noys 2014, 
33) – a lesson of history still not learned by some on the left. Predictably, China pleases 
accelerationists enormously – first and foremost, the afore-mentioned Nick Land, born 18 days 
before Douglas Coupland and a founding member of Warwick’s Cybernetic Culture Research 
Unit in the 1990s. Land eventually moved to Shanghai and in 2004 “described the modern 
Chinese fusion of Marxism and capitalism as ‘the greatest political engine of social and 
economic development the world has ever known’” (Beckett 2017). Eleven years later, Land 
became the “guru for the US-based far-right movement neoreaction” or NRx, advocating the 
“replacement of modern nation-states, democracy and government bureaucracies by 
authoritarian city states” (Beckett 2017). Fifteen years later, he participated in the neo-
reactionary conference accompanying a neo-Nazi art show at the now shut LD50 Gallery in 
London, whose director and Trump-policy-supporter, Lucia Diego, described the left as “more 
like a fascist organisation than the real fascists” while claiming that the audience was “liberal” 
(Ellis-Petersen 2017). As argued already, one never escapes the accelerated ideological 
interchangeability of the “anti” loop. More important however for the purposes of the present 
account is that accelerationism – a technophilia with a philosophical and a flexible social 
programme – has come to fill the void in the social imaginary created by the hegemony of anti-
communism, satisfying simultaneously a left that sees the mirage of a “future [that] remains 
open as a site of radical recomposition” (Hester 2018, 1) and a right that pushes for the 
legitimation of assisted yet “natural” supremacy of the fittest. If “openness” is the inherited yet 
futurological essentialism of post-structuralism (nothing is fixed; everything can change 
forever), supremacy, from the NRx perspective, is the historically lived yet also projected 
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outcome of openness: technology will rescript “natural selection” as a matter of course if 
obstacles are removed from technology’s way, and this carry on and on in an infinite evolution. 
This, of course, presupposes an abstract view of what we apprehend as technology today rather 
than an understanding of its origins in capital’s biopower exercises and capitalist modernity at 
large. But, as Groys assured us earlier, “contradictory practices”, or for that matter 
contradictory techno-speculative propositions, “are true in a deeper sense of the word”. True 
in proclaiming antagonisms as the eternal curse of post-Eden humanity, perhaps? This is 
history seen through the prism of ‘anti’ politics. 
But, you will say, it is not exactly like this. Civil society is not just a loop of “anti” and the 
left is not just a politics of opposition. There are many, if dispersed, initiatives of proposition, 
clustered around the common and the commons – words that, after all, have the same root as 
communism. The art field is a keen facilitator and mediator of such practices: the previous 
iteration of Athens Biennial (2015–2017) focused on “communing”; as also partly did the 
public programme of Documenta 14 (2017), especially its leg in Athens; as many others. The 
irony underpinning my choice of art-field examples should not be lost. This irony does not 
refer to the two institutions per se, but to how they became engulfed in the political culture of 
anti, despite intentions – with Documenta 14’s entrapment in the debt-nationalism nexus 
defining the post-2010 relationship of Greece and German capital preoccupying the 
international press since 2015. 
Without irony, I want to follow Dmitri Vilenski of Chto Delat who said a decade ago: 
“Notice how few people would call themselves communists, but there are many ‘commonists’” 
(Riff and Vilensky 2009, 469). The conversation in which he made this remark was 
appropriately titled “From Communism to the Commons?” and another issue raised in it was 
that “neoliberalism is all about allowing commons to arise for the sole purpose of their 
subsequent privatization” (Riff and Vilensky 2009, 466–467). The language of “social 
innovation” oft-deployed in justifying such initiatives outside the art world is symptomatic, as 
is the fact that worker-owned cooperatives such as the Greek VIO.ME must ultimately sell 
products in a competitive market, as seen on the site www.viomecoop.com. As for the art field, 
insofar as “society is outsourcing its politics to art, and that has become extremely profitable”, 
it is hard to rid yourself of the impression that “you have been installed as a readymade on a 
certain cultural field, and […] given a set of privileges, which even include free collaboration 
and political radicalism” (Riff and Vilensky 2009, 470): this is both the metaphorical and at 
times literal script of alienation in the struggle’s political process that acquires clearer contours in 
the art field’s ideal democracy. It is a cumulative but also dispersed effect that organises 
subjectivity by asking it to self-organise within a setting that resembles that of drama-fantasy 
film The Truman Show (directed by Peter Weir, 1998): the point of the film is not that the 
protagonist unknowingly lives his life observed by an audience but that his world has no real 
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horizon – yet, unlike many commoners, he at least eventually confronts his reality of “nowhere 
to go” within his current setting (sic).  
For these reasons, I would argue that the proliferation of commoning practices today, in 
art or the broader social field of antagonisms, when detached from explicitly combating anti-communism, 
intellectually and on the ground, merely recycles alienation as much as it helps make life livable, 
generating heterotopias of conviviality or controlled conflict, not too far removed from the 
principles of relational aesthetics and its obverse manifestation as the replication of friction – 
after all, is there anything else to do? I fail to see how this differs from the stance of Generation 
X in the 1990s: “We didn’t believe in global communism, but that doesn’t make us advocates 
of global capitalism” (Neate 2007). Thirty years later, does it not? 
Capitalism, which presents the democracy of equivalence as its great achievement, will 
have no problem with anti-fascism, diluted as yet another “anti”. Anti-fascism becomes more 
content within the form. Capitalism hardly has a problem with anti-capitalism, including the soft 
proposition politics of commoning without communism. As for art’s attachment to “agonism”, 
I concur with El Baroni that this “franchising [of] the empty signifier of democracy” happens 
“in the hope that this in itself will disrupt normal flows of information and exchange, and 
destabilize the totalitarian streak in liberal capitalism” (El Baroni 2017, 234). The futility of the 
hope is analogous to the number of destabilisation strategies we have seen since the emergence 
of post-structuralism. Yet El Baroni’s suggested solution of bringing forth “intersubjective 
practices of reasoning” would not break the loop of the politics of anti, precisely because such 
practices would merely “set out to construct new shared perspectives irreducible to, and 
transformative of, our individual perspectives” (El Baroni 2017, 235). Such practices would 
just generate more resilient forms of collectivism, but, given that this would necessarily happen 
within the democracy of equivalence, what would actually prevent such resilient collectivisms 
from being contained into fascist politics, which by default must always seek out and identify 
“the other” as the locus on which necropolitical power must be enacted? Understanding the 
project of 21st-century fascism is crucial here, and it becomes transparent in the case of 
Bolsonaro’s election to the Presidency in Brazil, of which Antonio Negri has offered an 
engaging analysis (Negri 2019), focusing precisely on what the Frankfurt School had identified 
as more perilous: fascism’s grab of power through democracy than through a coup: 
What is 21st century fascism? That of the 20th century sought to destroy the Soviets, in 
Russia or in any other part of the world where they could be found. Where are the 
Bolsheviks today? They are obviously fantasies. But neoliberalism’s fatigue in 
consolidating itself and the political crises that are added to the economic ones revive 
the fear of Bolsheviks. That insistence is astounding (Negri 2019). 
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What makes Bolsonaro a pertinent case study is, as Negri also asserts, his explicit commitment 
to eliminate the left (alongside his racial project of attacking “Blacks”, Brazil’s largest 
constituency) as the crucial (pre)condition for securing and deepening neoliberalism. Negri 
however does not refer to the left in his text but to “communists”, though we have not seen 
more self-identified communists in Brazil than in anywhere else. It would be more accurate to 
suggest that the revival “of the fear of Bolsheviks” pushes for a prefigurative anti-communism, 
which is what 21st-century fascism is fundamentally about. Negri himself briefly insinuates this 
when he tries to explain how the authoritarian turn of capitalism relates to the multitude:  
In productive terms, that cooperative power leads the multitude toward the common. 
However, when strong tensions intervene that act on the singularities (that compose 
the multitude) in terms, for example, of economic or environmental insecurity and fear 
of the future, then the multitudinous cooperation can implode as a defense of identity. 
The fascism of the 21st century seems to be sustained by such incidents in the 
cooperative nature of the multitude (Negri 2019). 
The issue raised deserves much more than the one paragraph Negri devotes to it, but we may 
wish to observe that the multitude, as Negri himself asserts, is led “toward the common” 
because “the development of the mode of production has placed the multitude in the center of class 
struggle” (Negri 2009, emphasis added). It should be obvious then insofar as the common 
serves the development of the mode of production, capitalism’s survival is dependent on 
keeping commoning separate from the prospect of communism – which is what requires both 
the violent anti-communism of Bolsonaro (and others) and the ideological anti-communisms 
elsewhere: liberal contexts take care of the matter not by direct suppression but by naturalising 
an anti politics without end as the essential feature of democracy. Art is such as liberal context 
– its illustration as an ideal democracy serves this purpose – and as artist Owen Logan noted 
in his talk “The Spirit of Fascism in the Arts” (19 January 2019, City Art Centre, Edinburgh), 
contrary to popular opinion, art, in general terms, has the effect of keeping subjects tied to 
hegemonic ideology as opposed to making subjects “open minded”. Logan’s analysis proceeds 
from reminding us of art as a “state craft” already in the service of “despotic Enlightenment in 
the 18th century” to the inscription of the “master” through authorship retained to this day. 
Thus, Owen’s recent analysis affirms Kester’s observations, cited earlier in this article, about 
the supervisory role of the artist in overseeing the desire for revolt carried from the field of the 
social to aesthetico-critical practices. Making this view more concrete, Marxist art historian 
Danielle Child (2019) recently showed through case studies how contemporary art is literally 
patterned on changes in capitalist production. Her narrative allows us to see that art, even if 
unwilling to admit it, exemplifies the limits of an imaginary rooted in the actually existing 
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economy. As I have said elsewhere (Dimitrakaki and Lloyd 2015), it is capitalism that practices 
economic reductionism rather than Marxism.  
If then El Baroni sees his preferred practices of reasoning as realised principally in the 
art field, would they not contribute further to the latter’s pacifying function as an even more 
ideal democracy? Intersubjective practices of reasoning are adequate guidance for the minute 
microcosms of love relationships – but to this we should counter-argue not only that fascists 
also love (on this see Håvard Bustnes’s documentary Golden Dawn Girls, 2017) but that when 
such practices are executed in the field of the social, dominated by the politics of anti, no one’s 
reasoning is ultimately better than anyone else’s in undermining the affective bonds required 
by the utopias that capital authorises as beneficial to its reproduction – as per Jameson’s quote 
in this article’s first section. This is why Lordon proposes a move to a reconfigured binary, 
which I would see as a way out of the recycling of anti: 
Today’s situation echoes the long-past slogan “socialism” or “barbarism”: on the one 
hand the paradoxical idea of the artist-employee escaping into the free association of 
workers, and on the other hand capital’s demand for the total subordination of the 
desires and affects of its subjects. The two seem to usher the present toward a formally 
very simple bifurcation: communism or totalitarianism (Lordon 2014, 126; emphasis added). 
The question is therefore whether reasoning might evolve into a political process that would 
eradicate alienation-in-the-struggle by returning to the negative space at the heart of democracy 
the content of a future in terms of this bifurcation – already underway where capitalist 
totalitarianism is concerned. Communism is, at present, the absent problem for capital, but 
which capital nonetheless foresees and solves with prefigurative anti-communism. Can this 
problem become present through the art field’s commitment to the radicalisation of the 
desiring subject? We have good reasons to doubt it. And yet, bringing this question into our 
field of vision might help at least to make us aware of the splinters of ideology in our wide-
open eyes that, in constant surprise, survey the dominion of sameness as the outcome of the 
procedures that turn us into the means of capital. 
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ABSTRAKT: Prezentowany artykuł śledzi, w jaki sposób współczesne pole sztuki bywa 
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stanowisko antypracy, jak również narrację wycofania w podziwie dla procesów przyspieszenia, 
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w kategoriach polityki „anty” (w tym antyfaszyzmu), co znajduje liczne przykłady w polu sztuki 
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wycofania z komunizmu i wycofania się samego komunizmu oraz stałego dla kapitalizmu 
przepracowywania prefiguratywnego antykomunizmu. 
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